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ABSTRACT
Against the background of ‘reform measures’ 
aimed at the judiciary in various Council 
of Europe Member States, this contribution 
addresses the question what one may expect from 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) when the independence of the judiciary 
comes under pressure. An analysis of the 
Strasbourg case-law shows growing concern for 
judicial independence. As a result, the position 
of both judges and litigants is strengthened. The 
principle of irremovability of judges is now clearly 
protected as an integral part of the right to a fair 
trial. Also it is now accepted that, as a general 
rule, Article 6 ECHR will apply to all types of 
disputes concerning disciplinary measures 
against judges. This means that a judge should 
have access to an effective remedy to challenge 
his dismissal. If an individual complains about a 
lack of independence of the courts, the Strasbourg 
Court will follow an objective, functional 
approach: it will examine if there are adequate 
guarantees against arbitrariness. The individual 
judge may have acted in an irreproachable way 
and there may have been no actual interference 
with his independence – all that is necessary but 
not sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 
6 ECHR. If safeguards against abuse are absent, 
the mere possibility that the executive could have 
interfered is enough to affect the independence of 
the court. In practical terms, however, it must be 
acknowledged that the ECHR has its limits: the 
dismissal of a judge is often a fait accompli that 
the Court may be unable to change. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
After decades of strong growth, the European 
system for the protection of human rights faces 
a serious recession. Traditional support for 
multilateralism is giving way to nationalism, 
populism and authoritarianism. Systemic 
human rights problems remain unaddressed in 
a number of countries, draining the resources of 
the Council of Europe’s supervisory bodies. The 
ideology of the ‘illiberal democracy’, proclaimed 
in 2014 by Hungarian strong man Victor Orbán, 
has been embraced by politicians across Central 
and Eastern Europe – and beyond. It is against 
this bleak background that the Polish judiciary 
has had to endure the series of ‘reform measures’ 
that Dr Paweł Filipek described in great detail in 
his contribution to this Revista. The situation 
in Poland is, unfortunately, not unique. As 
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe 
remarked, efficient, impartial and independent 
judiciaries are an obstruction to populism:
It should therefore come as no surprise 
that undermining the judiciary is on page one 
of the populist playbook. Many politicians 
may find themselves frustrated by judicial 
decisions. Often, when this occurs, they blame 
the law in question and seek legislative reform. 
The populist response, on the other hand, is 
to blame the courts themselves. Either the 
system is declared defunct or individual judges 
are portrayed as out-of-touch, self-serving and 
even corrupt. Such criticisms pave the way for 
political acts which circumvent the established 
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legal order and for reforms which weaken judicial 
authority and enable greater political influence.1
In this contribution, I want to address the 
logical follow-up question: what can we expect 
from the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) when the independence of the 
judiciary is under pressure? For sure, Article 6 
ECHR protects the independence of the courts:
Article 6 – Right to a fair trial
1. In the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. … 
But what can the European Court of 
Human Rights actually do to ensure that the 
courts are independent? Can it protect judges 
against unjustified dismissal? Can it support 
judges who are subjected to more or less subtle 
methods to ‘discipline’ them? Is there anything 
the Strasbourg Court can do about vehement 
attacks on the authority of the judiciary? One 
may recall a president slamming the order of 
a “so-called judge” as “ridiculous”, or a tabloid 
portraying judges as “enemies of the people”. 
2 Does the Court have anything to offer to 
litigants who claim that their case was heard by 
a court that lacked independence? What is the 
correlation between an overall break-down of the 
guarantees of the independence of the judiciary 
and the quality of individual courts and judges? 
If an individual complains about a perceived 
‘systemic’ lack of independence, without being 
able to show that ‘his’ judge was under pressure, 
isn´t that an actio popularis? How to measure 
independence, and how to prove a lack of it?
Big questions, but this article has modest 
ambitions. Rather than dwelling on theoretical 
perspectives on the concept of independence, it 
will look at practice – that is: the case-law of the 
Strasbourg Court. And it will explore only two 
perspectives: that of the applicant who claims 
that his case was not heard by an “independent” 
court (§ 2), and that of the judge who has been 
removed from office (§ 4). To what extent can 
they rely on the European Convention? In both 
areas there are interesting developments to 
report. Two special issues will be addressed as 
well, as a sort of side-steps: the question whether 
the ECHR allows extradition to a country where 
the judiciary is no longer independent (§ 3), 
and the question whether a judge who has been 
removed from office has the right of access to 
the confidential information that formed the 
basis of his dismissal (§ 5). Both issues attract 
particular attention in this day and age.
But we will start with the perspective of 
the individual applicant who invokes the right 
to an independent court. This will provide us 
with the necessary context to understand how 
the Strasbourg Court has approached the notion 
of judicial independence in general. 
2. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
AND ARTICLE 6 ECHR: THE 
LITIGANT’S PERSPECTIVE
2.1 General explorations
Remarkably little attention is given in the 
standard ECHR textbooks to the independence 
of the judiciary. That is surprising, as no-one 
in his right mind will deny the importance of 
having independent courts. Indeed, in the case 
of Micallef, dealing with injunction proceedings, 
the Court considered that the independence of 
the judiciary belongs to the ‘hard core’ of the 
right to a fair trial: 
the Court accepts that in exceptional cases 
– where, for example, the effectiveness of 
the measure sought depends upon a rapid 
decision-making process – it may not be 
possible immediately to comply with all 
of the requirements of Article 6. Thus, in 
such specific cases, while the independence 
and impartiality of the tribunal or the 
judge concerned is an indispensable and 
inalienable safeguard in such proceedings, 
other procedural safeguards may apply only 
to the extent compatible with the nature 
and purpose of the interim proceedings at 
issue. 3
“An indispensable and inalienable 
safeguard”: this is a guarantee to be reckoned 
with. Yet this importance does not translate 
into lengthy treatises – quite to the contrary. 
The excellent textbook of Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick, for instance, spends no more than 
three pages – of a total of more than 1000! – on 
the issue. 4 The same picture emerges from the 
other textbooks. 5 The explanation may well be 
that the independence of the courts was seen as 
a fairly obvious prerequisite, a mere foundation 
of the democracies that make up the Council 
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of Europe: indispensable but hardly visible. The 
case-law was about other things.
To the extent that the textbooks pay any 
attention at all to the independence of the 
judiciary, it is typically observed that there is a 
close inter-relationship between the guarantees 
of an ‘independent’ and an ‘impartial’ tribunal. 
In practice most cases relate to a perceived lack of 
impartiality of judges. In a few instances the Court 
found that there was actual dependence, prejudice 
or bias; but in real life this so-called ‘subjective’ 
test is difficult to meet because of evidentiary 
problems.6 This difficulty is compensated to 
an extent by the use of an ‘objective’ test and 
the identification of ‘functional’ problems: 
the judge’s personal conduct was not at all 
impugned, but the exercise of different functions 
within the judicial process by the same person, 
or hierarchical links with another actor in 
the proceedings justified misgivings as to the 
impartiality of the tribunal. 7
The leading case on independence is still 
Campbell and Fell v. UK from 1984, where the 
Court explained which factors it will take into 
consideration:
In determining whether a body can be 
considered to be “independent”, notably 
of the executive and of the parties to the 
case, the Court has had regard to the 
manner of appointment of its members 
and the duration of their term of office, 
the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures and the question whether 
the body presents an appearance of 
independence. … the irremovability of 
judges by the executive during their term 
of office must in general be considered as 
a corollary of their independence and thus 
included in the guarantees of Article 6 § 1.8 
Violations were found, but they were rare 
and related to rather specific issues: some features 
of the UK court-martial system, the participation 
of military judges in Turkish civil courts, the 
prosecution of civilians before military courts. 
9 Outside these more or less exotic situations, 
only few violations were established. Part of the 
explanation is that the Court was quite lenient; 
a short term of office, for instance, was accepted 
as permissible. In a situation where the law did 
not formally recognize the irremovability of 
judges, the Court considered that this did not 
in itself imply a lack of independence, since the 
irremovability of judges was recognised in fact 
and other guarantees were present. 10 
It should be noted, however, that most of 
this ‘classic’ case-law relates to administrative 
and disciplinary bodies. Moreover, it dates back 
to the 1980s and 1990s. 
2.2 Recent case-law
During the 1990s many States from Central 
and Eastern Europe ratified the ECHR. When 
under Communist rule, these countries had not 
been in a position to develop a strong tradition 
of separation of powers. 11 This may explain 
why judicial independence gradually started to 
receive more attention. Shortly after the turn 
of the century, for example, the Court was 
confronted with a practice – fairly common in 
Central and Eastern Europe – that the executive 
could challenge final judgments by lodging an 
objection (protest). In the Sovtransavto case 
(2002) the Court found in unambiguous terms 
that such a system is incompatible with the 
rule of law.12 Other cases featured complaints 
about the position of the court president, who is 
traditionally a very powerful figure in a number 
of countries in this region. In the Croatian case 
of Parlov and Tkalic (2009) the Strasbourg Court 
underlined that individual judges must be free 
not only from undue influences outside the 
judiciary, but also from within: there must be 
safeguards securing the independence of judges 
vis-à-vis their judicial superiors.13
The Brudnicka case (2005) involved a 
shipwreck in which both passengers and crew 
members lost their lives. When proceedings 
were instituted, in Poland, to establish the cause 
of the shipwreck, a Maritime Chamber held 
that the crew had been partly liable. The heirs 
of the sailors who died in the shipwreck then 
turned to the European Court, arguing that the 
Maritime Chamber had not been independent 
and impartial. The Court agreed:
In maintaining confidence in the 
independence and impartiality of a tribunal, 
appearances may be important. Given that 
the members of the maritime chambers (the 
president and vice-president) are appointed 
and removed from office by the Minister 
of Justice in agreement with the Minister 
of Transport and Maritime Affairs, they 
cannot be regarded as irremovable, and 
they are in a subordinate position vis-à-vis 
the Ministers. Accordingly, the maritime 
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chambers, as they exist in Polish law, 
cannot be regarded as impartial tribunals 
capable of ensuring compliance with 
the requirement of “fairness” laid down 
by Article 6 of the Convention. In the 
Court’s view, the applicants were entitled 
to entertain objective doubts as to their 
independence and impartiality. There has 
therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of 
the Convention. 14
The judgment was drafted in general 
terms – “the maritime chambers, as they exist 
in Polish law” – and the Court’s finding of a 
violation was in no way caused by the conduct of 
the individual judges in this specific case. Also 
it is worth observing that the Court confined 
itself to analysing the system as it was set out 
in law, and did not inquire whether judges were 
ever removed from office in actual fact. 15 The 
Court clearly attached more weight to the formal 
guarantees surrounding the irremovability of 
judges than it did in earlier case-law.
A similar violation of Article 6 was found 
in another Polish case, Henryk Urban and 
Ryszard Urban of 2010. The applicants had 
been convicted by a district court composed of 
an assessor (junior judge). Under Polish law as 
it stood at the time, a candidate for the office of 
district-court judge first had to serve a minimum 
of three years as an assessor. Assessors were 
legally qualified and appointed by the Minister 
of Justice. One year after the Urbans had been 
convicted, the Constitutional Court held that the 
situation was unconstitutional: assessors did not 
offer the guarantees of independence that were 
required of judges. 
In their application to the European Court 
the Urbans alleged that the district court that 
had heard their case was not an “independent 
tribunal”. The Court agreed:
Having regard to the foregoing, the Court 
considers that the assessor B.R.-G. lacked 
the independence required by Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention, the reason being 
that she could have been removed by the 
Minister of Justice at any time during 
her term of office and that there were no 
adequate guarantees protecting her against 
the arbitrary exercise of that power by 
the Minister (see, by contrast, Stieringer 
v. Germany, no. 28899/95, Commission 
decision of 25 November 1996, in which 
the relevant German regulation provided 
that dismissal of probationary judges was 
susceptible to judicial review). It is not 
necessary to consider other aspects of the 
status of assessors since their removability 
by the executive is sufficient to vitiate 
the independence of the Lesko District 
Court which was composed of the assessor 
B.R.-G. 16
Apparently the Government had learned 
from the Brudnicka case and supplied statistics 
indicating that the Minister of Justice had never 
exercised the power to remove an assessor. This 
did not, however, persuade the Court. A violation 
of Article 6 was found.
There is a certain ‘hypothetical’ element in 
the Brudnicka and Urban & Urban judgments 
which is important to acknowledge. The 
Minister could have removed the president 
from the Maritime Chambers, he could 
have removed the assessor from the District 
Court. It is immaterial that he did not; it is 
even immaterial that he never did this before. 
Apparently the mere possibility – nothing more, 
nothing less – of arbitrary interferences with 
judicial independence is sufficient to taint the 
independence of the court. 
The Polish cases echo an older and rather 
peculiar case: Van den Hurk (1994). Shortly after 
the Second World War a new type of economic 
regulation was introduced in the Netherlands. 
When in that context a new court, the Industrial 
Appeals Tribunal, was established, the Crown 
(i.e. the Minister) was given the power to refuse 
to execute its judgments, if this was considered 
necessary in the general interest. In practice this 
had never happened, and well before Mr Van 
den Hurk brought his case to the Tribunal, the 
Minister of Justice had stated in Parliament that 
this so-called section 74 procedure was a dead 
letter. Yet, section 74 had not been repealed 
and, as the Court noted, “there was nothing to 
prevent” the Crown from availing himself of 
the powers conferred upon it. As a result the 
Industrial Appeals Tribunal did not qualify as 
an “independent” court and a violation of Article 
6 was found.17 A year later the Court took the 
same approach in the British case of Bryan.18
An interesting aspect of the Van de 
Hurk case is that the Court flatly rejected the 
applicant’s claim that the mere existence of the 
Crown’s power had influenced the Tribunal’s 
decisions. He pointed out that only a very limited 
proportion of the appeals had been successful 
and suggested that in deciding these cases the 
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Tribunal had borne in mind the possibility of the 
Crown exercising its powers under section 74. 
Clearly the Court did not wish to speculate, nor 
was it necessary to do so:
The Court finds that there is nothing in the 
information at its disposal to indicate that 
the mere existence of the Crown’s powers 
under section 74 had any influence on the 
way the Tribunal handled and decided the 
cases which came before it. In particular, 
no significance can be attributed to the 
low success rate of appeals (…). Whether 
or not the requirements of Article 6 have 
been met cannot be assessed with reference 
to the applicant’s chances of success alone, 
since this provision does not guarantee any 
particular outcome. 19
What was decisive was that the executive 
could have refused to execute judgments of the 
Tribunal, not whether the Tribunal’s decisions 
had been influenced by the threat that the 
executive might use its powers.
2.3 Consequences of finding a lack of ju-
dicial independence
It is interesting to pause briefly and reflect 
on the aftermath of all these cases. What should 
happen once a lack of independence has been 
established? 
In principle the victim should be given, if 
he or she so requests, a retrial or a reopening 
of the case by a court that does meet all the 
requirements of independence and impartiality. 
In several judgments the Court expressly stated 
that this would be the most appropriate form 
of redress.20 Redress may also take the form of 
financial compensation. In several Strasbourg 
cases the applicant claimed damages, but such 
a claim rarely succeeds. In the case of Van den 
Hurk, for instance, the Court did not find a 
causal link between the lack of independence of 
the tribunal and the fact that the applicant had 
lost his case. 21 It may be of some comfort to Mr 
Van de Hurk that ‘his’ ruling served as a pilot 
judgment avant la lettre: a group of 23 similar 
cases ended in a friendly settlement between the 
applicants and the Dutch Government. 22 
The finding that a court lacks independence 
may affect very large groups of individuals who 
have been tried by that particular court at one 
stage. Are they all entitled to a rehearing of their 
case and/or financial compensation, or did they 
forfeit this right by failing to challenge the court? 
This question was addressed in the Polish case of 
Urban & Urban. Having found that the office of 
assessor was incompatible with the constitution, 
the Constitutional Court ordered that it should 
be abolished. But at the same time it adopted a 
pragmatic approach. Assessors constituted nearly 
25% of the judicial personnel in the district courts 
and their immediate removal would seriously 
undermine the administration of justice. The 
Constitutional Court therefore left a period of 
eighteen months for Parliament to enact new 
legislation (which it did); in the meantime 
assessors were allowed to continue adjudicating. 
Having regard to the constitutional importance of 
the finality of rulings, the Constitutional Court 
also observed that it would be disproportionate 
and contrary to legal certainty to allow challenges 
to final rulings given by assessors in the period 
when the manner of conferring judicial powers on 
them had not been constitutionally questioned. 
Therefore its judgment could not serve as a 
ground for reopening cases which had been 
decided by the assessors. This approach met with 
approval by the Strasbourg Court.23 
2.4 Conclusion
Five lessons can be derived from these 
explorations. The first one: in most cases involving 
judicial independence, the judge’s personal 
conduct does not really matter. The individual 
judge may have acted in an irreproachable way 
and there may have been no actual interference 
with his independence – all that is necessary 
but not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
Article 6 ECHR. The Court often follows an 
objective, functional approach: it examines, in 
essence, if there are sufficient guarantees against 
arbitrariness. 
The second lesson is related but distinct: 
the Court is inclined to analyse complaints in the 
abstract. That is to say: it is not necessary that an 
interference with judicial independence actually 
occurred to the detriment of the applicant. 
The mere possibility of such an interference is 
sufficient to affect the independence of the court. 
The third lesson is the logical consequence: 
the finding that a court, or a category of courts, 
lacks independence in an objective/functional 
sense is by definition systemic in nature. All 
courts belonging to the same category will suffer 
from the same defect. The law will need to be 
changed and the victims are entitled to redress. 
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Legal certainty and pragmatic considerations 
may entail, however, that old cases will not be 
re-opened and that transitional measures are 
needed. 
In the fourth place it is clear that there 
are varying degrees of seriousness. The mere 
existence of a competence, never used in 
practice, to set aside the rulings of a specialised 
economic court cannot really be compared to a 
package of measures deliberately seeking to foil 
the independence of the judiciary as a whole. 
However the Court has never had an opportunity 
to distinguish between these situations and it is 
as yet unclear if different consequences attach to 
different degrees of gravity. 
Finally, in the assessment of independence 
the irremovability of judges has become a crucial 
element. In applying this requirement the Court 
has become considerably stricter.
3. A SIDE-STEP: EXTRADITION TO A 
COUNTRY WHERE THE JUDICIARY IS 
NO LONGER INDEPENDENT?
At the time of writing a lot of attention goes 
to the A.C. case, in which the Irish authorities 
are requested – by way of a European Arrest 
Warrant (EAW) – to surrender an individual to 
Poland for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution. In March 2018 the Irish High 
Court noted “a systemic breach to the rule of 
law in Poland” and raised the question whether 
“the breaches of the rule of law are so egregious 
that they amount to a fundamental flaw in the 
system of justice in Poland”. This might entail 
that Mr A.C. would be placed “at real risk of 
an unfair trial” if he were to be surrendered to 
Poland.24
Against this background the High Court 
referred the matter to the EU Court of Justice 
for a preliminary ruling, essentially asking 
which kind of review is expected from the Irish 
courts before deciding whether to surrender Mr 
A.C. to Poland. The case is currently pending 
before the Luxembourg Court, and it is likely 
that a ruling will have been delivered by the time 
the present article sees the light of day. 25 There 
is little point in predicting the outcome, and a 
discussion of the extensive body of relevant EU 
law – tempting as it is – is beyond the scope of 
this contribution. But it is pertinent to dwell 
briefly on the requirements that flow from the 
ECHR in a situation such as this.
The first thing to note is that at present 
there is no Strasbourg case-law stating that the 
ECHR is opposed to extradition or surrender 
to Poland. Nor is there, to date, any judgment 
holding Poland in breach of the Convention 
because of recent changes in its justice system. 
Arguably it is too early for any pronouncement of 
the European Court, which typically needs three 
to four years (and often considerably longer) to 
deliver a judgment.26 So we will need to develop 
our analysis by extrapolating existing case-law.
Already in 1989, in the leading case on 
extradition, Soering, the Strasbourg Court held 
that the Convention is opposed to extradition 
where the individual concerned “has suffered 
or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial 
in the requesting country”.27 The Court has 
consistently repeated this position, although 
few violations have actually been found. Indeed 
the Court’s understanding of what constitutes a 
“flagrant denial of a fair trial” is quite strict:
forms of unfairness that could amount 
to a flagrant denial of justice …. include 
conviction in absentia with no subsequent 
possibility to obtain a fresh determination 
of the merits of the charge; a trial which 
is summary in nature and conducted 
with a total disregard for the rights of the 
defence; detention without any access to an 
independent and impartial tribunal to have 
the legality of the detention reviewed and 
deliberate and systematic denial of access 
to a lawyer, especially for an individual 
detained in a foreign country.
In other cases, the Court has also attached 
importance to the fact that if a civilian has 
to appear before a court composed, even 
only in part, of members of the armed 
forces taking orders from the executive, 
the guarantees of impartiality and 
independence are open to a serious doubt.
However, “flagrant denial of justice” is a 
stringent test of unfairness. A flagrant denial 
of justice goes beyond mere irregularities or 
lack of safeguards in the trial procedures 
such as might result in a breach of Article 
6 if occurring within the Contracting State 
itself. What is required is a breach of the 
principles of fair trial guaranteed by Article 
6 which is so fundamental as to amount 
to a nullification, or destruction of the very 
essence, of the right guaranteed by that 
Article. 28
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In the Al Nashiri case, where this quote 
comes from, the Court actually found that the 
threshold had been met, partly because the 
military commission that would try the applicant 
did not offer guarantees of independence of the 
executive. 29
The important thing to note, however, 
is that this branch of case-law – including the 
“stringent test of unfairness” – was developed 
in the context of cases involving extradition to 
States not bound by the ECHR. It is clear that 
the Convention does not govern the actions of 
third States, nor does it require the Contracting 
Parties to impose Convention standards on 
other States.30 This ‘external’ dimension is 
lacking in cases such as A.C., where both states 
concerned are bound by the ECHR. That might 
be used as an argument for more leniency (one 
might expect other States Parties to comply with 
the Convention, so why insist?) or against it (by 
requiring full respect for Convention guarantees 
one does not introduce any new obligations). 
Leaving that aside, it must be acknowledged 
that the need to collaborate in the fight against 
crime – which is of course an argument 
for law enforcers not to create obstacles to 
measures such as extradition – is as legitimate 
a consideration in intra-EU cooperation as it 
is in international cooperation. Maybe it is an 
even stronger consideration, given the ease with 
which persons – including suspects and fugitive 
offenders – can cross borders within the EU. 
So the question is which “test of unfairness” is 
appropriate in a purely European setting. Should 
extradition (or “surrender” as it is called under 
the EAW system) only be refused if there is a risk 
of a “flagrant denial of a fair trial”, as in Soering? 
Or should the threshold be lower? And if it is 
lower, is the prospect of “mere irregularities” 
sufficient to block extradition? Or should the 
threshold be somewhere in between?
States which are parties to the ECHR 
may assume that other Contracting States will 
perform their treaty obligations in good faith and 
hence secure the rights and freedoms laid down 
by the Convention. That expectation, however, 
does not always match reality. Depending on 
the circumstances, States parties may be obliged 
to verify the fate that awaits an individual who 
they are about to transfer to another Contracting 
State. In the context of asylum law, for instance, 
the Court has held that the presumption of 
compliance with the ECHR can be rebutted 
where “substantial grounds” have been shown 
for believing that the person whose return to 
another ECHR State is being ordered faces a “real 
risk” of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3 in the receiving country. 31
In the case of the EAW, an assessment of 
this type is rendered more difficult since the 
EU Member States agreed on a system which 
recognises only a limited set of circumstances 
where the requested state can decide not to 
surrender the person. In itself that is not 
necessarily problematic. The Strasbourg Court 
has accepted various mutual recognition 
mechanisms which are founded on the principle 
of mutual trust between the Member States of 
the European Union. The Court has repeatedly 
asserted its commitment to international and 
European cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters.32 
Nevertheless, the Court has stated, the 
methods used to bring about such cooperation 
must not infringe upon the guarantees of the 
Convention. The principle of mutual recognition 
should not be applied automatically and 
mechanically to the detriment of fundamental 
rights.33 Mutual trust does not mean” blind 
trust. In the case of Avotinš (2016) the Court 
made clear what this means for the domestic 
courts:
the court in the State addressed must 
at least be empowered to conduct a 
review commensurate with the gravity 
of any serious allegation of a violation of 
fundamental rights in the State of origin, 
in order to ensure that the protection of 
those rights is not manifestly deficient. … 
where the courts of a State which is both a 
Contracting Party to the Convention and a 
Member State of the European Union are 
called upon to apply a mutual recognition 
mechanism established by EU law, they 
must give full effect to that mechanism 
where the protection of Convention rights 
cannot be considered manifestly deficient. 
Here the French version of the judgment 
is actually stronger: “c’est en l’absence de toute 
insuffisance manifeste des droits protégés par la 
Convention qu’elles donnent à ce mécanisme 
son plein effet”. At any rate the judgment 
continues:
However, if a serious and substantiated 
complaint is raised before them to the 
effect that the protection of a Convention 
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right has been manifestly deficient and 
that this situation cannot be remedied by 
European Union law, they cannot refrain 
from examining that complaint on the sole 
ground that they are applying EU law.34
So courts must keep their eyes open and 
answer four questions: (1) did the individual raise 
a “serious and substantiated complaint”, (2) does 
this complaint suggest that “the protection of a 
Convention right has been deficient”, (3) is this 
deficiency “manifest” and (4) can the situation 
be remedied by European Union law?
No mention is made in Avotinš of a 
“stringent test of unfairness” as was developed in 
the Soering and Al Nashiri cases. The individual 
is not required to demonstrate that a “flagrant 
denial of justice” or “the destruction of the very 
essence of the right guaranteed by Article 6” awaits 
him in the receiving country. The condition 
that a deficiency is “manifest” is different: it is 
not about the nature or the seriousness of the 
alleged violation, but about whether it is clearly 
cognisable by a foreign court. 35 
Avotinš was about the enforcement of 
civil judgments. Does the same approach also 
apply in EAW cases? An affirmative answer was 
provided in the Pirozzi case of 17 April 2018. 
In this case Belgium surrendered the applicant 
to Italy in 2010 under an EAW, with a view to 
enforcing a lengthy prison sentence. Mr Pirozzi 
complained that the Belgian authorities had 
failed to review the EAW, although it had been 
based on a conviction, in 2002, resulting from a 
trial in absentia. The Court first confirmed the 
approach chosen in Avotinš: domestic courts 
must review serious allegations of violation of 
fundamental rights in the requesting State.36 It 
then noted that the Belgian courts had actually 
examined the merits of the complaints that Mr 
Pirozzi had raised under the Convention. They 
had thus ensured that the execution of the EAW 
would not lead to a manifest lack of protection of 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention.37 The 
Court did not find a violation, as Mr Pirozzi’s 
criminal conviction in Italy did not appear to 
result from a procedure that was manifestly in 
breach of the ECHR. Again, the test was whether 
there was a “manifest” breach of the Convention, 
not whether there was a “flagrant” one. 38
Back to the A.C. case. Having tried to 
connect the dots of the Strasbourg case-law, we 
should now be able to state whether the ECHR 
permits the surrender of Mr A.C. to Poland, or 
least which test will apply. 
Unfortunately, despite all efforts we are 
still not there yet. The most appropriate cases – 
Avotinš and Pirozzi – are in a way looking back: 
they concern the question whether a foreign 
judgment, that has allegedly been rendered 
in breach of Article 6, should be enforced. In 
Avotinš the foreign judgment is of a civil nature, 
in Pirozzi it is criminal, but in both cases it is 
possible to establish with certainty if a violation 
of Article 6 has occurred. The case of Mr A.C. 
on the other hand, is forward-looking: what 
will happen to him once he is returned to 
Poland? There is a degree of speculation here. 
On the other hand, as we have seen in § 2, the 
finding that a court, or a category of courts, lacks 
independence in an objective/functional sense is 
by definition systemic in nature. Any individual 
appearing before these courts will be confronted 
with the same defect. It remains to be seen if 
this temporal aspect amounts to a meaningful 
difference. 39
With that caveat in mind, it would seem 
that the position under the ECHR seems clear. 
It is up to Mr A.C. (1) to raise “serious and 
substantiated complaints” that (2) the protection 
of his rights in Poland is deficient whereas (3) 
this deficiency is “manifest”. And it is up to the 
CJEU to give a reply to the fourth question: can 
the situation be remedied by European Union 
law? If the latter question is answered in the 
negative, then the case will sooner or later be 
brought before the Strasbourg Court.
As to the first requirement, is it 
indispensable for a “serious and substantiated 
complaint” to be based on existing Strasbourg 
case-law? Apparently not, at least not for the 
Irish High Court since it has established, on 
the basis of a lengthy analysis and a wealth of 
materials, the existence of “a systemic breach to 
the rule of law in Poland”. On the second point 
it seems that for Mr A.C. to succeed he has to 
prove a lack of safeguards in Poland to such an 
extent as would result in a breach of Article 6 
if occurring within Ireland itself. That should 
not be an insurmountable obstacle. This brings 
us to the third issue, i.e. how “manifest” the 
breaches of Article 6 in Poland need be. In this 
connection we have seen in § 2 that the focus 
will be on objective and functional questions. 
Are there guarantees against arbitrariness? Can 
judges be removed by the executive without any 
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effective judicial review? An individualised test 
would not be needed, nor would it be useful. 
It is rather difficult to predict the conduct of 
individual judges, and also – it is not decisive.
 The final issue to be considered is 
which weight should be attached, if any, to 
the public interest in the fight against crime. 
Many cases are of a serious nature – Mr Pirozzi 
was convicted to 14 years’ imprisonment for 
drug trafficking, Mr A.C. is wanted for similar 
offences. One would not want fugitive offenders 
to evade justice. But Article 6 ECHR does not 
contain a limitation clause as some other ECHR 
provisions do. And if the independence of the 
judiciary – unlike other procedural safeguards – 
is “an indispensable and inalienable safeguard”, 
as the Court stated in Micallef, then there is 
very little room to balance interests. If this room 
does not exist in purely internal situations, then 
one would need compelling arguments and a 
creative interpretation of Article 6 to introduce 
it in cooperation schemes established in the 
framework of the EU, where all States involved 
are bound by the ECHR.
4. THE DISMISSAL OF JUDGES AND 
ARTICLE 6 ECHR 
4.1 General remarks
Having made my first incursions into the 
Court’s case-law, I will now focus on the second 
main topic of this article: if a judge has been 
removed from office, can he (or she40) rely on the 
European Convention to fight his dismissal?
As the Polish cases described above 
illustrate, the irremovability of judges is a 
cornerstone of judicial independence.41 The 
dismissal of a judge, then, is arguably the most 
extreme intrusion that can occur. Dismissal 
will have on obvious impact on the individual 
concerned, but it is also likely have a chilling 
effect on the judiciary as a whole. Of course, 
there may be good reasons to take disciplinary 
measures against a judge, or even dismiss him. 
The European Convention does not guarantee 
the right to be a judge and the European Court is 
not a labour court; we cannot expect it to review 
the personnel file, assess the evidence and weigh 
the pros and cons of a particular disciplinary 
sanction as a sort of ‘fourth instance’ domestic 
court.
But what the Strasbourg Court can do, 
is ensure that a fair and proper procedure had 
been followed at the domestic level. The Court 
may be called upon to do this in very different 
circumstances: 
• the classic scenario, whereby disciplinary 
measures are taken against an individual 
judge, in a procedure set out by law; 42
• the authoritarian scenario, whereby the 
executive assumes the power to fire individual 
judges without further explanation; 43
• the ‘Baka scenario’, named after the former 
President of the Hungarian Supreme Court, 
Andras Baka, who was forced to resign 
following the introduction of new legislation 
changing the conditions for eligibility as a 
Supreme Court judge; 44
• the lustration scenario, whereby employees 
in the public sector, including judges, are 
subjected to a vetting procedure, as a result of 
which they may lose their position.45
In each of these scenarios the judge who 
has been removed from office may claim that 
this is unjustified, and he may seek a domestic 
remedy to challenge his dismissal. 
Leaving issues of reputation – as protected 
by Article 8 ECHR – aside,46 the key question 
is: is Article 6 ECHR, the right to a fair trial, 
applicable if a judge is dismissed? The answer is 
less obvious than one might be inclined to think: 
for a long time the Court had taken the view that 
disputes relating to dismissal from the judiciary 
fell outside the scope of Article 6 ECHR. 47 The 
Court’s position, however, is rapidly changing. 
In order to understand this development, we 
must take a few steps back and analyse Article 6 
ECHR in a systematic way.
4.2 The scope of Article 6 ECHR – ‘cri-
minal’ cases
One might expect that the dismissal of a 
judge, with all the serious consequences that it 
entails, can be seen as a “criminal charge” within 
the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. According to the 
Strasbourg case-law, however, this is far from 
obvious. To explain this, we need to go back in 
history and explore the scope of application of 
Article 6 ECHR. Already in 1976, in the famous 
case of Engel, the Court noted:
All the Contracting States make a 
distinction of long standing, albeit in different 
forms and degrees, between disciplinary 
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proceedings and criminal proceedings. For the 
individuals affected, the former usually offer 
substantial advantages in comparison with the 
latter, for example as concerns the sentences 
passed. Disciplinary sentences, in general less 
severe, do not appear in the person’s criminal 
record and entail more limited consequences. 
It may nevertheless be otherwise; moreover, 
criminal proceedings are ordinarily accompanied 
by fuller guarantees. 48 
The Court then introduced three criteria 
to distinguish disciplinary sanctions from 
the penalties prescribed by criminal law: the 
domestic classification of the offence in question, 
the ‘very nature of the offence’, and the nature 
and severity of the penalty that may be imposed. 
It is the second criterion that is of most interest 
here. For the Court, disciplinary sanctions are 
generally designed to ensure that the members 
of a particular group comply with specific rules 
governing their conduct, whereas the norms of 
the criminal law are in principle addressed to the 
population as a whole.49 Since Engel the Court 
has consistently held that disciplinary discharge 
from the armed forces cannot be regarded as a 
criminal penalty for the purposes of Article 6 of 
the Convention.50
This approach has consequences if 
a public servant is dismissed by way of a 
disciplinary measure. If domestic law classifies 
his misconduct as a disciplinary offence, and if 
this offence is linked to the exercise of specific 
functions within the State apparatus, then the 
Strasbourg Court will view the proceedings 
as being of a purely disciplinary nature, not 
belonging to the criminal sphere. 51 This also 
holds true if these measures are triggered by 
complaints alleging inappropriate behaviour 
that could also be viewed as a criminal offence, 
and even if these allegations will damage the 
reputation of the public servant in question.52 
4.3 The lustration cases and the scope 
of Article 6 ECHR
Recently, however, the overall picture of 
the case-law in this area – strict but clear – has 
become somewhat blurred. This is the result of 
a number of cases in which the Court dealt with 
so-called ‘lustration’ schemes, as introduced by 
several East-European countries after the Cold 
War. These countries dealt with their past in 
different ways. Of course there was a certain 
focus on punishing acts committed during the 
communist regime, which raised questions 
concerning foreseeability and retroactive 
application of the law. 53 But of greater interest 
for present purposes are the various attempts 
to remove from public office those who were 
affiliated with the former communist regime.
Thus, in Lithuania former KGB employees 
were banned for a period of 10 years from working 
in the public sector and in certain private sector 
jobs. In Bulgaria a system was introduced, 
after lengthy negotiations, that merely aimed 
at “exposing” individuals who featured in the 
files of the former security services, without 
purporting to sanction or dismiss them. In 
Poland yet a different approach was chosen: the 
idea was to punish those who failed to disclose 
their past collaboration with the State’s security 
services under the former communist regime. 
Thus, the 1997 Lustration Act introduced an 
obligation to make a declaration concerning 
work for or collaboration with those services, 
and provided for the dismissal from public office 
of persons who were found to have lied when 
making this declaration. In the latter case a ten-
year ban on holding certain public offices was 
imposed. When this system was challenged in 
the Matyjek case, the Court was prepared to 
treat these measures as a criminal punishment 
within the meaning of Article 6, in view of their 
legal nature and their effects. 54 As a result, States 
adopting lustration measures have to ensure that 
persons affected thereby enjoy full procedural 
guarantees, including equality of arms. 55 
This is all well, but it raises a question: 
why does Article 6 apply to lustration cases, but 
not to individual cases where a public servant is 
dismissed by way of disciplinary measure? True, 
the Polish lustration measures could have “a very 
serious impact on a person”, as the Strasbourg 
Court noted: although neither imprisonment 
nor a fine could be imposed, individuals could 
be deprived “of the possibility of continuing 
professional life”. But that element did not 
play such a weighty role in the ‘ordinary’ cases 
concerning, for instance, disciplinary discharge 
from the armed forces. So how to explain the 
difference? Here we need to speculate since the 
Court did not attempt to distinguish the two 
categories of cases. The outside observer is left 
with the impression that the following factors 
may have played a role: the large group of 
individuals who were affected by the lustration 
laws; the institutionalised nature of the operation, 
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whereby all individuals were systematically 
vetted; and the nature of the proceedings which 
possessed many strong criminal connotations, 
involving a lustration court and a Commissioner 
of Public Interest who was vested with powers 
identical to those of the public prosecutor.
4.4 The scope of Article 6 ECHR – ‘civil’ 
cases – general considerations
Article 6 also applies to civil cases, and 
the question is whether the dismissal of public 
servants may fall under the “civil heading” of 
Article 6 ECHR. The importance of this question 
will be clear: an affirmative answer implies that 
the public servant must have access to court 
and should be able to enjoy all the guarantees 
of Article 6 § 1 ECHR. But the Court’s initial 
position was that Article 6 ECHR does not cover 
these disputes at all: the decision to dismiss a 
public servant is a classic example of the exercise 
of State sovereignty. 56
However in 1999, in the case of Pellegrin v. 
France, the Court changed direction. 57 Realising 
that there is a wide variety in the kind of work 
that public servants do – ranging from cleaners 
to diplomats – the Court introduced a new, 
“functional” criterion. It took the nature of the 
employee’s duties and responsibilities as the 
defining point. What matters is if the person 
concerned exercises powers conferred by public 
law, designed to safeguard the general interests 
of the State. If this is the case, the Court ruled, 
then Article 6 will not apply – that is: the 
ECHR allows the situation where the executive 
authorities alone may decide on the dismissal 
of this specific category of public servants; and 
it accepts that the courts have no power to 
review this decision. Whereas in all other cases 
Article 6 will apply, an exception is made if the 
dismissal concerns a public servant who acted as 
the depositary of public authority and who was 
responsible for protecting the general interests of 
the State. A manifest example was provided, the 
Court said, by the armed forces and the police. 
But this new approach did not live long. 
In 2007, in the Finnish case of Vilho Eskelinen, 
the Court realised that the application of the 
functional criterion could lead to anomalous 
results. 58 The case concerned six individuals 
who were involved in a labour dispute with 
their employer, the Ministry of the Interior. 
The dispute was identical for all the applicants, 
and they had actually defended their interests 
together in a joint action before the Finnish 
courts. In Strasbourg they complained that they 
were denied an oral hearing in the proceedings 
concerning their salaries and that the proceedings 
were excessive in length. But as it happened, five 
applicants were police officers; number six was an 
office assistant with a purely administrative task. 
On a strict application of the Pellegrin approach, 
the latter applicant would enjoy the guarantees 
of Article 6, whereas the police officers would 
not. The Court realised that this outcome would 
not be acceptable. It therefore introduced a new 
approach. In very many Contracting States, the 
Court noted, access to a court was accorded to 
public servants, allowing them to bring claims 
for salary and allowances, or even claims in 
relation to dismissal or recruitment, on a 
similar basis to employees in the private sector. 
The domestic system, in such circumstances, 
perceived no conflict between the vital interests 
of the State and the right of the individual to 
judicial protection. It would be strange if in these 
cases the Human Rights Court would not give 
this protection. The Court therefore adopted the 
following approach. If a State wants to argue that 
an individual cannot invoke Article 6 because 
he is a public servant, two conditions must be 
fulfilled. Firstly, the State in its national law 
must have expressly excluded access to a court 
for the category of staff in question. Secondly, 
this exclusion must be justified on objective 
grounds in the State’s interest. The mere fact 
that the applicant was active in a sector which 
participated in the exercise of public power was 
not in itself decisive. The State would also have 
to show that the subject matter of the dispute in 
issue was related to the exercise of State power 
or that the special bond of trust between the 
State and the public servant had been called into 
question.
So since 2007 there is, in effect, a strong 
presumption that Article 6 applies to labour 
disputes between public servants and their State. 
In exceptional cases Article 6 may not apply, 
but then it is for the respondent Government 
to demonstrate, first, that the applicant in his 
capacity as a public servant does not have a right 
of access to a court under national law and, 
second, that the exclusion of his rights under 
Article 6 is justified.
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4.5 The scope of Article 6 ECHR – ‘civil’ 
cases – dismissal of judges
What about the dismissal of judges? Here 
we see a considerable development in the case-
law too. In 2001, in the case of Pitkevich v. 
Russia, the Court still held that disputes relating 
to dismissal from the judiciary fell outside the 
scope of Article 6 ECHR. 59 The Court recalled 
its Pellegrin judgment of two years before, and 
noted that a judge has specific responsibilities 
in the field of administration of justice, which 
is a sphere in which States exercise sovereign 
powers. The Court concluded Ms Pitkevich 
could not complain about the alleged failure 
to provide her with a fair trial after she was 
dismissed as a judge.
But since then the Court has changed 
direction. Already in 2009, two years after 
Eskelinen, the Court held Article 6 ECHR to 
be applicable to the proceedings concerning the 
disciplinary dismissal of Mr Olujić, the President 
of the Supreme Court of Croatia. Applying the 
Eskelinen test, the Court examined the extent to 
which domestic law limited access to the courts. 
In Croatia the law expressly excluded judicial 
protection in this area: the competence to impose 
disciplinary sanctions on judges was granted to 
the National Judicial Council (NJC) alone. Yet 
that was not the end of the story: the Strasbourg 
Court examined the powers of the NJC and the 
nature of the proceedings before it. It noted that 
these proceedings followed the rules of criminal 
procedure, which included all the guarantees 
provided by Article 6 of the Convention and 
enabled the accused to submit a defence. When 
ruling in disciplinary proceedings against judges, 
the NJC was empowered to establish the facts of a 
given case, hold hearings, hear witnesses, assess 
other evidence and decide on all the questions 
of fact and law. The Strasbourg Court therefore 
concluded that the NJC had actually exercised 
judicial powers in determining the disciplinary 
responsibility of Mr Olujić. Consequently, the 
disciplinary proceedings against him had been 
conducted before a “tribunal” for the purposes 
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. For the Court 
this was the reason to hold Article 6 applicable.60
Four years later, in 2013, the Strasbourg 
Court reached a similar conclusion in the case 
of Mr Volkov. Mr Volkov had been a judge of 
the Supreme Court of Ukraine. At one stage he 
was accused of misconduct, and in 2010 the 
Ukrainian Parliament voted for his dismissal. 
When Mr Volkov complained in Strasbourg of 
a violation of Article 6 ECHR, the Court again 
recalled its Eskelinen judgment of 2007, and 
repeated that labour disputes between public 
servants and the State may fall outside the scope 
of Article 6 only if the State in its national law 
has expressly excluded access to the courts. Now 
whereas Mr Olujić had been dismissed by the 
Croatian NJC, Mr Volkov had been dismissed 
by Parliament – and one might be tempted to 
think that Parliament is certainly not a court. 
But the Court held differently. It stated that it 
is not prevented from qualifying a particular 
domestic body, outside the domestic judiciary, 
as a “court” for the purpose of the Eskelinen 
test: “An administrative or parliamentary body 
may be viewed as a “court” in the substantive 
sense of the term, thereby rendering Article 6 
applicable to civil servants’ disputes”.61 A breach 
of the Convention was found in this case and 
the Strasbourg Court made clear that Ukraine 
should secure Mr Volkov’s reinstatement “to the 
post of judge of the Supreme Court” – so not just 
reinstatement as ‘a’ judge, but quite specifically 
as judge of the Supreme Court – at the earliest 
possible date. 
Then, in 2016, there was the high profile 
case of Baka v. Hungary.62 The case concerned Mr 
Baka’s dismissal as President of the Hungarian 
Supreme Court as a result of new legislation 
regulating the composition of the Supreme Court. 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights observed, first, that the domestic 
law provided Mr Baka with the right to serve 
his term of office until such time expired. This 
was also supported by constitutional principles 
regarding the independence of the judiciary and 
the irremovability of judges. Accordingly, Mr 
Baka had been entitled to protection against 
removal from office during his mandate. The 
fact that his mandate was terminated by new 
legislation could not remove, retrospectively, 
this right under the applicable rules in force at 
the time of his election. 
Next the Court observed that Mr Baka had 
not been expressly excluded from the right of 
access to a court. The Court added that, even 
if national legislation would exclude access to a 
court, this would to have be compatible with the 
rule of law. And the rule of law forbids laws directed 
against a specific person, as in the applicant’s 
case. In the light of these considerations, the 
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Court accepted that Article 6 was applicable 
under its civil head to the dismissal of Mr Baka. 
A violation was found. The key message of 
Baka is that there is a strong presumption that 
Article 6 applies to disputes concerning judges 
– all types of disputes, including those relating 
to recruitment/appointment, career/promotion, 
transfer and termination of service/dismissal.
Similar decisions were issued in recent 
years as regards Slovakia63, Italy64, Armenia65, 
Macedonia66, Portugal67, Georgia68 and Cyprus69. 
The Armenian case is worth mentioning in a bit 
more of detail. The applicant was a judge who 
was dismissed pursuant to a President’s Decree. 
She was unable to contest this Decree before the 
domestic courts. Although Armenian law granted 
individuals the right to seek the annulment of 
unlawful acts of public authorities, the ordinary 
courts had developed a practice not to examine 
claims against the acts of certain public bodies, 
including the decrees of the President. The 
European Court of Human Rights noted on 
the one hand that national legislation did not 
expressly exclude access to a court – which 
meant that Article 6 was applicable – and on the 
other hand that the applicant had been unable 
to obtain a substantive court ruling on her case 
– which meant that Article 6 had been violated.
4.6 Article 6 ECHR and the dismissal of 
judges: conclusion
So what are we to make of this? First, 
actually a surprisingly high number of cases 
before the European Court of Human Rights, 
involving a wide variety of countries, deal with 
the dismissal of public servants, including 
judges. Second, in line with its general case-law, 
the Strasbourg Court has now firmly established 
a strong presumption that Article 6 ECHR 
applies to disputes about these disciplinary 
measures. Of course the mere fact that Article 
6 applies does not mean that a dismissal is not 
justified; depending on the circumstances it 
may be perfectly legitimate to take disciplinary 
measures against a public servant. But the reasons 
justifying a dismissal will be subject to review by 
the courts. Third, this situation is the result of a 
rather creative application of the Eskelinen test. 
In the majority of cases the Court has found that 
the first condition, that is, whether national law 
“expressly excluded” access to a court for the 
post or category of staff in question, was not 
fulfilled and that Article 6 was thus applicable 
to the proceedings in question. But even if 
national law expressly excluded judicial review, 
that was not the end of the story. In Baka the 
Court stated that such exclusion has to be in 
conformity with the rule of law – a requirement 
that is difficult to fulfil. In other cases the Court 
considered whether the disciplinary authority in 
question qualifies as a “court” for the purposes of 
the Eskelinen test. To that end the Court looked 
at whether the disciplinary authority performed 
a judicial function and at the nature of the 
proceedings before it. And so the Court found 
that Article 6 was applicable in cases where the 
power to impose disciplinary measures had been 
reserved for a National Judicial Council or even 
Parliament.
It is submitted that by now the Eskelinen 
test is de facto amended, and that Article 6 
will apply to public service cases tout court, 
even if we have to wait for a formal recognition 
of this reality. 70 But at any rate it is clear that 
the Court’s more recent case-law has certainly 
strengthened the protection of public servants 
against arbitrariness in general, and the principle 
of irremovability of judges more in particular.
5. A SIDE-STEP: DISMISSAL OF JUDGES 
AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION
Now that we have established that, as a 
rule, Article 6 ECHR will apply to cases involving 
the dismissal of judges, it is time to address 
a key issue in some cases: access to materials 
classified as confidential. The usual argument of 
those affected by lustration or similar measures 
is that these measures are based on unreliable 
materials or documents that do not show that 
they have really collaborated. But in order to 
substantiate that claim, they need to have access 
to the records.
Here we touch upon a classic dilemma. 
Typically the secret service or agency compiling 
the information may wish to deny access to 
its files, so as to avoid disclosing how much it 
actually knows, to protect its sources and to keep 
its working methods secret. On the other hand, 
if the person to whom the classified materials 
allegedly relate is denied access to all or most of 
the materials in question, his or her possibilities 
of contradicting the agency’s version of the facts 
will be severely curtailed. By the same token the 
absence of truly adversarial proceedings may 
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make it more difficult for the unbiased judge to 
retain his neutral position. This dilemma is likely 
to play a role in any case involving the dismissal 
of public servants in order to protect national 
security, as it often does in cases involving 
corruption, terrorism and organised crime 
too.71 But it is also highly relevant in Albania, 
for instance, where all judges are currently 
undergoing a vetting procedure; confidential 
information is bound to play a crucial role. 72
In the post-communist lustration cases 
the question of access to materials assumed a 
distinct role since the proceedings were, by their 
very nature, oriented towards the establishment 
of facts dating back to the communist era. This 
inevitably depended on the examination of 
documents relating to the operations of the former 
communist security agencies. In this specific 
context the Court developed an important rule of 
thumb: unless the contrary is shown on the facts 
of a specific case, it cannot be assumed that there 
remains a continuing and actual public interest 
in imposing limitations on access to materials 
classified as confidential under former regimes.73
Outside the specific context of post-
communist lustration measures, the issue of 
access to confidential materials took centre 
stage in the recent Grand Chamber judgment 
in the case of Regner.74 Mr Regner was not a 
judge, but a high-ranking official at the Czech 
Ministry of Defence. In 2006 the National 
Security Authority (NSA) decided to revoke 
his security clearance, on the grounds that he 
posed a risk to national security. The decision 
did not indicate the confidential information 
on which it was based, as this was classified 
“restricted” and could not therefore legally be 
disclosed to Regner. 
An application by Regner for judicial review 
of the decision was dismissed by the Czech 
courts. It is important to note that the NSA 
forwarded the documents in question to the 
courts. However, Regner was not permitted to 
consult them. Relying on Article 6 § 1 ECHR, 
Regner complained that the administrative 
proceedings had been unfair because he had 
been unable to have sight of decisive evidence. 
But in Strasbourg he lost his case too. In 2015, a 
Chamber of the Strasbourg Court held that there 
had been no violation of the Convention, finding 
that the decision-making procedure had as far 
as possible complied with the requirements of 
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and 
incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the 
applicant’s interests.
In 2017, the Grand Chamber agreed. 
There were several key elements in the Court´s 
reasoning: the domestic courts had unlimited 
access to all the classified documents on which 
the NSA had based itself; they had the power 
to carry out a detailed examination of the 
reasons relied on by the NSA for not disclosing 
the classified documents; and they could order 
disclosure of those that they considered did 
not warrant that classification. They could also 
assess the merits of the NSA’s decision revoking 
security clearance and quash, where applicable, 
an arbitrary decision. Their jurisdiction 
encompassed all the facts of the case and was 
not limited to an examination of the grounds 
relied on by Regner, who had been heard by 
the judges and had also been able to make 
his submissions in writing. In conclusion the 
Strasbourg Court ruled – in very cautious terms 
– that the fair balance between the parties had 
not been affected to such an extent as to impair 
the very essence of Regner’s right to a fair trial. 
It should be noted, however, that a considerable 
minority disagreed and believed that the Czech 
courts should have gone further. 75
In a nutshell: the Court is flexible and 
realistic; it gives considerable leeway to the 
national authorities which seek to defend 
national security. But at the same time the Court 
carries out a thorough review of the quality of the 
trial. The scope of the powers of the domestic 
courts is crucial in this respect. The Strasbourg 
Court insists on serious procedural safeguards 
so as to protect individual rights to the fullest 
extent possible and, in the final instance, to 
prevent arbitrariness.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS: RIGHTS 
THAT ARE PRACTICAL AND 
EFFECTIVE?
The analysis of the Strasbourg case-
law leads us to some final observations. The 
European Court shows concern, today to a 
much larger extent than before, for judicial 
independence and the protection of judges 
against undue pressure. From the perspective 
of the judiciary, the greatest gain is that the 
principle of irremovability of judges is now 
clearly established as a key element of the right 
to a fair trial. As a general rule, Article 6 ECHR 
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will apply to all types of disputes concerning 
disciplinary measures against judges, including 
those relating to recruitment/appointment, 
career/promotion, transfer and termination of 
service/dismissal. 
If an individual complains about a lack of 
independence of the courts, the Strasbourg Court 
will follow an objective, functional approach: 
rather than looking at what actually happened in 
the court room, the Court will examine if there 
are adequate guarantees against arbitrariness. 
The individual judge may have acted in an 
irreproachable way and there may have been 
no actual interference with his independence 
– all that is necessary but not sufficient to 
meet the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. The 
mere possibility that the executive could have 
interfered is enough to affect the independence 
of the court.
This is ‘good’ news for the judges in Poland 
who have lost their position as a result of the recent 
package of reform measures. The presidents and 
vice-presidents of the ordinary courts who have 
been removed from their position by the Minister 
of Justice; the president and judges of the Supreme 
Court who have lost their seat as a result of the 
newly introduced age requirement; those who 
had been elected to the Constitutional Tribunal 
but were not sworn in by the President of the 
Republic – they all have a right to access to court 
to have their situation reviewed. The quality and 
usefulness of such a judicial review procedure 
will depend, of course, on the independence of 
the adjudicating body. There is some irony here, 
because their very dismissal may have affected 
or even undermined the independence of the 
courts they were forced to leave. But despite this 
catch-22, they have the right to a court. And in 
due course the Strasbourg Court may be called 
upon to review the existence and quality of the 
available remedies.
However, the Convention is intended 
to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or 
illusory but rights that are practical and effective 
– this has been the mantra in the Court’s case-
law since the 1970s. 76 When looking at the 
Court´s record in the field under consideration 
here, one cannot help wondering if the Court 
manages to live up to this ambition. It takes 
the Court a very long time to decide the cases 
before it. True, the Baka case was dealt with 
relatively quickly, the Court’s judgment is very 
well drafted and its reasoning is compelling – but 
still the judgment was delivered about four years 
after Mr Baka was dismissed as President of the 
Hungarian Supreme Court. For Lajos Erményi, 
at the time the number 2 of the same court, the 
judgment came really too late: he died during 
the proceedings in Strasbourg. 77 
Of course these delays can be explained 
(the Court has a huge case-load) and to some 
extent unavoidable (cases need to be prepared). 
But there are at least two reasons why delays in 
this particular brand of cases are so damaging. 
The first one is simply that every case involving 
dismissal should be dealt with special diligence. 
78 It is not just about preserving income, it 
is also about avoiding a fait accompli. A new 
president will have been appointed, and the 
longer one waits, the more irreversible the newly 
created situation becomes. Mr Volkov lost his 
seat in the Ukrainian Supreme Court in 2010. 
The Strasbourg Court found a violation of the 
Convention in 2013, and ordered Ukraine to 
secure Mr Volkov’s reinstatement to his previous 
post. To date, that has not materialised. 79
Secondly, while it may be true in many 
areas that delays can be fatal – think of child 
abduction cases – we are here concerned with 
violations that strike at the heart of the rule of 
law. They deserve the highest priority, since the 
enforcement of all other rights and freedoms 
depends on the quality of the domestic courts. 
One must not lose sight of why we have the 
European Court in the first place. It is useful 
to go back to 1949, and listen to the words of 
Pierre-Henri Teitgen:
Democracies do not become Nazi countries 
in one day. Evil progresses cunningly, with 
a minority operating, as it were, to remove 
the levers of control. One by one freedoms 
are suppressed, in one sphere after another. 
Public opinion and the entire conscience are 
asphyxiated. And then, when everything 
is in order, the Führer is installed and the 
evolution continues even to the oven of the 
crematorium.
It is necessary to intervene before it is too 
late. A conscience must exist somewhere 
which will sound the alarm to the minds 
of a nation menaced by this progressive 
corruption, to warn them of the peril and to 
show them that they are progressing down 
a long road which leads far, sometimes 
even to Buchenwald or Dachau.
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An international Court, within the Council 
of Europe, and a system of supervision and 
guarantees, could be the conscience of 
which we all have need, and of which other 
countries have perhaps a special need. 80
If, as Teitgen argued, it is necessary 
to intervene before it is too late, then the 
intervention itself must be quick and decisive. 
An early warning system must be early, or it 
shall cease to be a system.
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